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States' Use of the Unitary Method: A
Taxing Burden on International
Commerce
I. Introduction
That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that
it is retained by the states; that it is not abridged by the grant of
a similar power to the government of the Union; that it is to be
concurrently exercised by the two governments; are truths which
have never been denied. But such is the paramount character of
the Constitution that its capacity to withdraw any subject from
the action of even this power is admitted.'
Although the Constitution grants the federal government power
to lay and collect taxes,2 nothing in the Constitution makes this
power exclusive. The states undeniably exercise a concurrent power
of taxation with the federal government.3 A state's ability to tax,
while not prohibited by the Constitution, is, however, subject to Con-
stitutional limitations. One such limitation is the commerce clause.4
Under the commerce clause, Congress has plenary power to regulate
taxation by the states.5 But even in the absence of any affirmative
action by Congress, courts have been willing to infer a limitation on
a state's taxing powers from the free trade policy that lies at the
heart of the commerce clause.6 Determination of whether a state tax
is subject to limitations imposed by the dormant commerce clause'
depends upon the balance struck between state and federal interests.
I. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819).
2. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes . U.S. CONST. art.
1, §8.
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton).
4. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
5. Act of Sept. 14, 1958, Pub. L. No. 86-272 §§101-202, 73 Stat. 555, amended by 15
U.S.C. §§381-84 (1970) (prohibiting state taxation of sellers of tangible property whose in-
state activities are limited to solicitation of orders).
6. See, e.g., Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (state tax on Japa-
nese cargo containers); Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (state tax on gross receipts earned
outside the state); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962) (state tax on railroad
cars used in interstate commerce); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) (state tax
on steamships used in interstate commerce); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307
(1938) (state tax on gross receipts from interstate sales).
7. The term dormant commerce clause, as used here, refers to the judicial tendency to
implement the values implicit in the commerce clause by restricting state actions that inhibit
the flow of commerce between states and nations even when Congress has not legislated. See
generally, G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256-71 (10th ed. 1980).
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A state is primarily interested in maximizing its tax revenues and in
maintaining the greatest possible degree of sovereignty. 8 The federal
government, on the other hand, is interested in maintaining and en-
couraging a free flow of commerce.9
One area in which these interests have come into conflict is state
taxation of multinational corporations. The problem arises from the
difficulty involved in ascertaining the exact percentage of a multina-
tional corporation's income attributable to a particular taxing juris-
diction in a given year. The states have devised a method known as
the unitary method for allocating the total income of a multinational
corporation between the jurisdictions in which the corporation oper-
ates.10 A formula incorporated in the unitary method determines the
percentage of income generating activities existing within a particu-
lar jurisdiction and allocates to that jurisdiction an equivalent per-
centage of the corporation's income." The Supreme Court first rec-
ognized the constitutionality of the unitary method as applied to a
multistate corporation in United States Glue v. Oak Creek.'2 The
Court has since sided with the states in upholding the application of
the unitary method to multistate corporations in the large majority
of cases.1 s
8. See, e.g., State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearings on H.R. 5076 Before
the Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1980) (statement of Theodore
W. de Louze, Chief Tax Counsel, State of Oregon) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
9. See, e.g., id. at 177 (statement of Charles S. Levy, Vice President, Emergency
Committee for American Trade).
10. See Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, ST. & Loc. TAXES (P-H),
ALL STATES UNIT 1 91, 409-A (1967) [hereinafter cited as UDITPAJ.
11. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
12. 247 U.S. 321 (1918). Wisconsin determined the amount of income attributable to
sources within the state by measuring the dollar value of sales and property within the state as
a percentage of the total value of sales and property of the entire corporation. This percentage
was then multiplied by the total income of the corporation to ascertain the percentage of in-
come attributable to the state. Defendant glue company vainly argued that the method unduly
burdened interstate commerce because it taxed income earned outside the state.
13. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (Wisconsin
determined the income of Exxon's in-state marketing activities by apportioning a percentage of
Exxon's entire operating income); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)
(Vermont used the unitary method to allocate a percentage of dividends paid to Mobil by its
subsidiaries throughout the world; although Mobil is a multinational corporation, it waived the
objection that the tax would burden international commerce by conceding that all of its for-
eign dividends were subject to tax in the United States); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267 (1978) (Illinois apportioned Moorman's income on the basis of sales occurring within the
state); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (Washington apportioned
General Motors' wholesale sales receipts to determine sales occurring within the state and
taxed the corporation accordingly); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959) (Minnesota taxed the percentage of Northwestern's entire income that
was proportionate to the amount of payroll, property, and sales existing within the state);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) (California apportioned a percentage of Butler
Bros.' net income to sources within the state despite the fact that the state branch operated at
a loss for the year in question); Underwood Typewriter v. Chamberlin, 254 U.S. 113 (1920)
(Connecticut apportioned a percentage of Underwood's net income to sources within the state
on the basis of property owned by Underwood within the state). But see F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982) (New Mexico's application of the
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After the constitutionality of the unitary method as applied to
multistate corporations was thus established, states began to use this
method to tax the income of multinational corporations.14 In this
new context, the focus of the Court's scrutiny shifted from interstate
commerce to international commerce. At first, it appeared that the
increased scrutiny of state taxing procedures required by the foreign
commerce clause would tilt the balance in favor of the federal gov-
ernment. In Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles,1 5 the Supreme Court
prohibited application of an apportioned property tax to instrumen-
talities of foreign commerce by states on the grounds that it was an
undue burden on international commerce. In so holding, the Court
enunciated two tests that a state tax must pass, in addition to the
normal commerce clause requirements,16 to survive a constitutional
challenge under the foreign commerce clause. First, the tax must not
create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation.1 7 Second,
the tax must not prevent the federal government from speaking with
one voice when regulating commerce with foreign nations.' 8 The
state tax involved failed both tests because it inevitably led to double
taxation and created a risk of retaliation by United States' trading
partners.19
Despite the holding in Japan Line, the Court's deference to the
federal interest in maintaining a free flow of international commerce
did not last long. In the recent case of Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board,20 the Supreme Court upheld California's use of the uni-
tary method to tax the earnings of a domestically based multina-
tional corporation. Container Corp. argued, among other things,
that, like the tax involved in Japan Line, California's apportioned
income tax was invalid because it inevitably led to double taxation."
unitary method to dividends received from Woolworth's subsidiaries taxed income earned
outside of the state); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982)
(Idaho's use of the unitary method effectively taxed business that had no connection with the
state); Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) (North Carolina's uni-
tary tax formula attributed an excessive amount of income to sources within the state).
14. See e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE ANN. §25120(f) (West 1979) (including foreign
countries in definition of a state for purposes of allocating income between states).
15. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
16. Generally, under the commerce clause, a state tax may not discriminate against
interstate or foreign commerce in favor of domestic commerce. See, e.g., id. at 445.
17. Id. at 446.
18. Id. at 448. This requirement is designed to insure the federal government's ability
to deal effectively with foreign nations in the area of commercial relations. "If we are to be one
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations." THE FEDERALIST No.
42 (J. Madison).
19. Id. at 453.
20. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983)
(No. 81-523).
21. Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 21-40, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 81-523).
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The Court disagreed, distinguishing Japan Line on its facts.2" Re-
verting to its earlier position, the Court sided with the states, holding
that the Constitution does not prohibit application of the unitary
method to domestically based multinational corporations.
This comment will discuss the constitutionality of state use of
the unitary method to tax multinational corporations. After consider-
ing the problems involved in allocating income between the jurisdic-
tions in which a multinational corporation operates,2" the comment
will examine the two predominant methods of allocation designed to
solve these problems.24 The discussion will then analyze and criticize
the Court's decision in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board.5
II. The Problem
A. Transfer of Income
The relationship between component parts of a multinational
corporation creates substantial difficulties for countries which must
determine the amount of income generated within their borders for
tax purposes. Such difficulties arise because income generated by a
component in one country is often realized by a related component in
another country. This transfer of income from one jurisdiction to an-
other can occur in two ways. Related components of a multinational
corporation can deal inter se at less than arm's length, 26 or a compo-
nent of a multinational corporation can passively receive a flow of
value from a related component.27
Related components of a multinational corporation that share a
common economic or business interest by virtue of their common
ownership will frequently buy and sell services or products to one
another at prices that differ from those charged on the open market.
This practice of setting prices at artificial levels is commonly re-
ferred to as transfer pricing,28 and results in transferring income
generated in one country to a component in another country.2 9 Al-
22. Container Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995.
23. See infra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 47-128 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 129-187 and accompanying text.
26. Arm's length transactions are those transactions which occur on the open market
between unrelated corporations. See Madere, International Pricing: Allocation Guidelines and
Relief From Double Taxation, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Madere].
27. Flow of value denotes benefits that a component of a large corporation receives by
virtue of its affiliation with the entire corporation. See McLure, Operational Interdependence
Is Not The Appropriate Bright Line Test Of A Unitary Business - At Least Not Now, 18
TAX NOTES 107 (1983) [hereinafter cited as McLure].
28. See generally, Madere, supra note 26.
29. For example, suppose that parent X manufactures its products in country A and
sells these products to subsidiary Y in country B at cost instead of normal wholesale market
price. Subsidiary Y can then sell the products at normal retail market price in country B and
realize a profit that consists of both its own markup on the product and the markup that could
[Vol. 2:2
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though transfer pricing may be motivated by the corporation's desire
to avoid taxes, 30 a multinational corporation may also have legiti-
mate business reasons to utilize this procedure.31 Regardless of the
motivation, however, the net effect is that one country loses the op-
portunity to tax income that was generated within its borders and
therefore may remain uncompensated for the benefits and protection
it afforded the corporation through its laws.
Income can also shift from one country to another through the
flow of value between related components of a multinational corpora-
tion.32 Subsidiaries of a multinational corporation often receive sub-
stantial economic benefits by virtue of their affiliation with the mul-
tinational corporation as a whole.33  These benefits include
centralized management,34 economies of scale,35 enhanced reputation
and goodwill," and increased bargaining power.3 7 Such benefits con-
tribute to the profitability of the subsidiary of a multinational corpo-
ration. Thus, part of the profit realized by a subsidiary is attributa-
ble to activities of other components, most likely including a parent.
In many cases, the subsidiary does not compensate the parent for
these profit generating activities.3 8 The result is an uncompensated
have been charged and earned by parent X. In this way, profit margin that is attributable to
parent X is transferred to subsidiary Y. Thus, income that constitutes this profit margin, which
was generated through the manufacturing process in country A, is transferred to country B
where it is realized.
Income can be shifted back the other way from country B to country A in the same type
of transaction. If parent manufacturer X charges an inflated wholesale price to subsidiary Y
and subsidiary Y then sells the product at normal retail market price in country B, the profit
that subsidiary Y should have realized in country B will be transferred to country A as part of
the inflated wholesale price charged by parent X.
30. If the rate of taxation in country A is significantly higher than the rate of taxation
in country B, the multinational corporation will certainly profit by transferring income from
country A to country B. Of course, transfer pricing will only reduce a multinational corpora-
tion's tax liability if it is engaging in business in countries with different rates of taxation. The
rates of corporate income taxation in industrialized western countries are approximately the
same. Madere, supra note 26, at 108.
31. A multinational corporation may engage in transfer pricing to bolster the financial
stability of a foreign subsidiary or to expand a distributor's client base by subsidizing the
distributor with lower prices. See generally Note, Multinational Corporations and Income
Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Multinational Corporations].
32. See infra notes 47-128 and accompanying text.
33. See generally Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of In-
come, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Keesling & Warren].
34. Centralized management may be more effective than regional management because
it can orchestrate all the components of a multinational corporation. If all the components are
operating in harmony, resources will be used in the most efficient way possible and group
profits will be maximized. McLure, supra note 27, at 108-9.
35. When the corporation as a whole buys in bulk, it can receive a better price than
could an individual component purchasing a small quantity of material just for its own needs.
36. A small unknown business may benefit significantly in terms of increased visibility
and recognition from its affiliation with an internationally recognized corporation.
37. A business that becomes affiliated with a large multinational corporation will be
less vulnerable to the capricious effects of a fluctuating market. It will therefore be in a better
position to bargain with its competitors.
38. Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 33-35, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
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transfer of value from the country in which the parent company op-
erates to the country in which the subsidiary operates."9
B. Reallocation of Income
Transfer of income between jurisdictions can seriously erode a
country's tax base and thereby reduce its tax revenues. Most nations
accept the proposition that the country in which the income was gen-
erated-the source country-has the right to tax that income.40 Ac-
cordingly, the problem arises of how to reallocate to the source coun-
try income that has been transferred to another country.
Reallocation, however, is difficult to accomplish. When a corpo-
ration generates income by activities occurring in a number of differ-
ent countries, allocation of a portion of that income to the country in
which it was generated is mere conjecture.41 The uncertainty has
spawned differing opinions concerning the means of achieving proper
allocation. Two diametrically opposed methods of allocating income
have been advanced as the proper manner of arriving at an equitable
allocation-the arm's length method and the unitary method.
The basic difference between the two is the way in which each
characterizes the relationship between the components of a multina-
tional corporation.42 The arm's length method views each component
of a multinational corporation as a separate, individual entity, deal-
ing at arm's length. Accordingly, this approach requires the tax ad-
U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (81-523).
39. The transfer of income resulting from the functional integration of a multinational
corporation can occur in any number of ways. The cited examples are some of the more obvi-
ous benefits. For a general discussion of some of the less obvious benefits arising from func-
tional integration, see generally McLure, supra note 27.
40. In the field of income allocation there is an important distinction between source
country and residence country. The source country is the country in which income is gener-
ated. The resdience country is the country in which the corporation that realizes the income
resides. Most bilateral agreements between countries require the residence country to recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the source country to tax income. See Surrey, Reflections on the Allo-
cation of Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 LAW AND POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss 409, 409-412 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Surrey].
The United Nations Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Develop-
ing Countries has established a set of guidelines providing that source countries have primary
jurisdiction to tax income. Because these guidelines were designed to be a model for tax trea-
ties concluded between countries, it is likely that the trend toward recognizing the source coun-
try's jurisdiction to tax will continue. See generally, Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts
and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1978).
41. "It has long been recognized that the effort to attribute precisely the profits of a
large multicorporate business to any particular jurisdiction is futile. It is akin to asking what
proportion of Ron Guidrey's pitching power is due to his legs, chest, shoulder, elbow, and wrist
respectively." Hearings, supra note 8, at 21 (Statement of Byron Dorgan, the past Chairman
of the Multistate Tax Commission).
The Supreme Court noted that "[a]llocating income among various taxing jurisdictions
bears some resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow." Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987, 4996 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (81-523).
42. Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 31, at 1206.
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ministrator to scrutinize every intracorporate transaction to deter-
mine whether arm's length prices were charged for the goods or
services exchanged. If they were not, the tax administrator reallo-
cates income to reflect the distribution of income that would have
occurred had arm's length prices prevailed.43
The unitary method considers the components of a multina-
tional corporation as members of a single unitary business; intracom-
pany transactions are ignored. Because the unitary method views all
components of the multinational corporation as one large business,
no income is realized for tax purposes until a transaction is con-
ducted with an unrelated person. The income of the entire unitary
business is then allocated between the components of the business on
the basis of an abstract formula."
The arm's length method and the unitary method each have
their own adherents. Most nations employ a version of the arm's
length method,4 5 while a number of states have adopted the unitary
method."'
43. Whenever a corporation engages in transfer pricing it is not dealing at arm's
length. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. When the tax administrator discovers
transfer pricing, he is empowered to reallocate the income involved. See I.R.C. §482 (P-H
1983). See also infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. The proper distribution of income
for any given transaction is determined by reference to comparable transactions that did in
fact occur on the open market at arm's length. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
See generally Bishel, Tax Allocations Concerning Inter-Company Pricing Transactions in
Foreign Operations: A Reappraisal, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 490 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tax
Allocations].
44. The formula works on the assumption that certain identifiable factors of production
such as payroll, property, and sales, exist within a jurisdiction. The formula allocates the in-
come of a multinational corporation to jurisdictions according to the value of the factors of
production existing within that jurisdiction. See generally Keesling & Warren, supra note 33.
See also Wahrhafting, Allocation Factors in Use in California, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1961).
45. See e.g., I.R.C. §482 (P-H 1983). See also Treas. Reg. §1.482 (P-H 1983) (United
States); CAN. REV. STAT. C 63, §69(1) (1971) (Canada) as cited in Madere, supra note 26, at
113 n.50; Income and Corporations Tax Act 1970, §485(1) (United Kingdom) as cited in
Madere, supra note 26, at 113 n.49; CODE GENERAL DES IMPOTS art. 57 (66 ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1967) as cited in Madere, supra note 26, at 114 n.51. See also Surrey & Tillinghast,
General Report, 56 b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 1, 12 (Report to the
Twenty-fifth International Congress on Financial and Fiscal Law) (1971) as cited in Madere
supra, note 26, at 113 n.7.
46. See, e.g., UDITPA, supra note 10. States adopting the uniform act include Ala-
bama (ALA. CODE §40-27-1, art. IV (1975)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §43.19.010, art. IV
(1962)); Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§43-1131 to 43-1150 (1975)); Arkansas (ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§84-2055 to 84-2073 (1967)); California (CAL. REV. & TAX CODE ANN.
§§25120 to 25139 (West 1979)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §24-60-1301, art. IV (1974));
Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. §§235-2 to 235-39 (1968)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §63-3027
(1977)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§79-3271 to 79-3293 (1977)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT.
§141.120 (1983)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 §§5210, 5211 (1978)); Michigan
(MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §205.581, art. IV (1978)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §32.200,
art. IV (Vernon 1976)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§15-31-301 to 15-31-313 (1983));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §77-2901, art. IV (1943)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §376.010,
art. IV (1981)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§7-4-1 to 7-4-21 (1978)); North Dakota
(N.D. CENT. CODE §§57-38.-12 to 57-38.-14 (1983)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§314.605 to
314.670 (1983)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§12-7-1110 to 12-7-1200 (1976)); South
Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §10-54-1 art. IV (1982)); Texas (TEX. TAX. - GEN. ANN.
§141.001, art. IV (Vernon 1982)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§59-13-78 to 59-13-97 (1953));
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III. National and International Approach
A. The Arm's Length Method
In order to tax all income that is generated within its borders, a
country must be able to reclaim income that has been transferred
out of the country. 7 Most countries reclaim such income by using
the arm's length method. 9 This method is premised on the belief
that an equitable distribution of income would have occurred be-
tween two unrelated parties dealing at arm's length on the open mar-
ket. Such open market transactions provide a standard-fair market
value-by which income may be reallocated.
The tax administrator does not have authority to question the
districution of income that occurs under the rules of the uncontrolled
market place.5" Accordingly, in most countries, before reallocating
income, the tax administrator must make a preliminary finding that
the corporations in question are commonly owned or controlled. 1
This common ownership or control serves to remove the parties from
the free market, and thereby justifies imposition of an objectively
determined reallocation of income.5 2
In the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury has the au-
thority to reallocate income. 3 Although the Internal Revenue Code
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §32.56.010, art. IV (West 1965)).
47. See supra, notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
48. It is almost universally accepted that the country in which the income was gener-
ated has the right to tax that income. See supra note 40.
49. This is the method utilized by the United States. For example:
X's International Division engages in a wide range of sales promotion activities.
Although most of these activities are undertaken exclusively for the benefit of
X's international operations, some are intended to jointly benefit both X and Y
and others are undertaken exclusively for the benefit of Y. The district director
may make an allocation to reflect an arm's length charge with respect to the
activities undertaken for the joint benefit of X and Y consistent with the relative
benefits intended as well as with respect to the services performed exclusively for
the benefit of Y.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b) 3 example I (P-H 1983).
In many countries the arm's length method is statutorily authorized. See supra note 45.
Other countries, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, rely on the general provisions of
their revenue laws to reallocate income according to the arm's length standard. Madere, supra
note 26, at 111.
50. In free market societies the uncontrolled market place is permitted to set the prices
that will be charged for goods and services. Any resulting injustice is attributable to the fluctu-
ations of the uncontrolled market place. See Surrey, supra note 40, at 414.
51. The actual form of ownership or control is not determinative. What is important is
the substance or reality of a common economic interest. See Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(a) 3 (P-H
1983).
52. See Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971) (subsidiar-
ies under control of parent precluded possibility of arm's length dealing). But see Brittingham
v. Comm'r, 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979) (absence of a common design to shift income was
sufficient to prove absence of control even though business was owned by members of the same
family).
53. In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or business (whether or not incor-
porated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, appor-
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gives the Secretary wide latitude to reallocate income by any means
he chooses, the regulations explicitly require use of the arm's length
method of allocation. 4 The types of transactions for which the regu-
lations provide a reallocation procedure include loans or advances, 55
performance of services,5" use of tangible property,57 transfer or use
of intangible property,58 and sale of tangible property.5 9 In each
case, the regulations require the Secretary to determine the arm's
length price for a particular transaction by reference to the price
which would have prevailed in the same or a similar transaction be-
tween unrelated parties on the open market."
The reallocation of a multinational corporation's income be-
tween components operating in different countries may well result in
economic double taxation.61 Because there is often a substantial time
lag between the transaction that gives rise to the original distribution
of income and reallocation of that income by the taxing authority of
one of the countries in which the corporation operates, the corpora-
tion will likely already have paid taxes on that income in one country
before a second country makes its reallocation and assesses a
deficiency. 2
tion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such orga-
nizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allo-
cation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses. I.R.C. §482 (P-H 1983).
54. "The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer deal-
ing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)i (P-H 1983).
55. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(a) (P-H 1983). See also P.P.G. Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r, 55
T.C. 928 (1970) (interest imputed to parent corporation to account for an interest free loan
made to a subsidiary).
56. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b) (P-H 1983). See also Ltr. Rul. 8109014 P-H Fed.
(1981) (provision of free aircraft services required allocation of income to affiliated corporation
that provided the services).
57. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(c) (P-H 1983). See also Welworth Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 40
B.T.A. 97 (1939) (income imputed to subsidiary corporation because it charged its parent
company an insufficient amount of rent for office space).
58. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(d) (P-H 1983). See also Rev. Rul. 77-83, 1977-1C.B. 139(income may be imputed to a subsidiary for selling stock to its parent at less than fair market
value).
59. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e) (P-H 1983). See also Aladdin Indus. Inc., T 81,245 P-H
Memo T.C. (1981) (income may be imputed to a corporation that sells land at less than fair
market value to another corporation as long as the two corporations are commonly owned).
60. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(a)2(i) (P-H 1983); Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b)3 (P-H 1983);
Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(c)2(i) (P-H 1983); Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(d)2(i) (P-H 1983); Treas. Reg.
§1.482-2(e)(i) (P-H 1983). The difficulty involved in finding comparable uncontrolled transac-
tions is the most serious defect of the arm's length method. See infra notes 84-90 and accom-
panying text.
61. Regular double taxation refers to the imposition of two taxes on the same income
of a single taxpayer. In contrast, economic double taxation occurs when two taxes are imposed
on the same income, but the taxes are paid by two different taxpayers. Economic double taxa-
tion only occurs when income has been reallocated from one taxpayer to another and both
taxpayers are required to pay a full tax on that income. See Oetjen, The Competent Author-
ity's Role in Resolving International Tax Issues, 26 TAX EXECUTIVE 57, 60-61 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Oetjen].
62. Suppose that income has been shifted from a parent in country A to a subsidiary in
country B through transfer pricing. The subsidiary would pay tax on the income to country B
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The obvious avenue of relief in this situation is for the corpora-
tion to seek a correlative adjustment 63 from the first country and a
corresponding refund of taxes paid on the reallocated income.64
Countries, however, are often unwilling to make such adjustments in
response to another jurisdiction's reallocation of income, especially
when the original taxing jurisdiction considers the original allocation
of income to be correct.6 5 Similar disagreements over the correct dis-
tribution of income may arise when the countries use different allo-
cation methods producing different results.6 6 National government
reluctance to provide some sort of unilateral relief6 7 for multina-
tional corporations subjected to double taxation has encouraged the
creation of bilateral agreements designed to prevent double taxation,
and to remedy such double taxation when it does occur.6 8
B. Income Tax Treaties
Bilateral agreements attempt to mitigate the detrimental impact
in the year it is realized. A few years later, country A discovers the transfer pricing. Accord-
ingly, country A reallocates the income and assesses a tax on that income. If the parent pays
the tax, economic double taxation will have occurred.
63. A correlative adjustment is an adjustment of tax liability in one country made in
response to the reallocation of income by another country. See Tax Allocations, supra note 43,
at 500-09.
64. See Treas. Reg.. §1.482-1(d)2 (P-H 1983), authorizing the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to make correlative adjustments when both components of the corporation involved are in
the United States. This, of course, provides no relief in the international sphere. For a discus-
sion of international correlative adjustments see Miller, Proposals for Amelioration of Section
482 Allocations Affecting U.S. Taxpayers with Foreign Affiliates, 44 TAXES 209 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Miller].
65. It is almost an axiom of international taxation that no taxing jurisdiction
will agree to reduce the amount of income subject to its tax merely because
another taxing jurisdiction has allocated additional income to a related entity.
• . . More often than not, our Service will not recognize the foreign country's
reallocation of income, even though the Service would have insisted on the same
type of reallocation had the roles of the United States entity and the foreign
corporation been reversed.
Phillips, The Current Status of the Application of Section 482 to Foreign Related Corpora-
tions, 48 TAXES 472, 474 (1970), quoting Aidinoff, Special Problems Involved in Dealings
Between United States Corporations and Foreign Related Corporations, N.Y.U. 25TH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 415 (1967).
66. Disagreements over the correct distribution of income may also arise between coun-
tries that use the same allocation method when, because of defects inherent in the method, it
produces inconsistent results. See Miller, supra note 64, at 214-15. See also infra notes 89 and
90 and accompanying text.
67. Unilateral relief refers to any type of tax exemption or tax credit provided by a
single country in order to mitigate the harmful effects of double taxation. See, e.g., Rev. Proc.
64-54, 1954-2C.B. 1008-10 (providing a limited exemption from increased taxes assessed by
the federal government resulting from reallocations under section 482). Cf. Rev. Proc. 65-17,
1965-1 C.B. 835 (providing a limited credit that may be applied to reduce increased tax liabil-
ity resulting from reallocations under §482). The problem with unilateral relief, however, is
that it requires one country to bear the full burden of relieving economic double taxation when
the cause of the double taxation is overlapping assertions of jurisdiction by two or more coun-
tries. One country is rarely willing to play the good guy while other countries pocket the tax
revenues. See generally Kragen, Avoidance of International Double Taxation Arising From
Section 482 Reallocations, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1493 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kragen].
68. See J. BISCHEL, INCOME TAX TREATIES 1-7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BISCHEL].
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of conflicting income allocations on the free flow of international
commerce eo while preserving the ability of national governments to
reallocate income to prevent tax evasion.70  Bilateral agreements
work in two ways to achieve this goal. The first seeks harmonization
of income allocation methods to prevent conflicting allocations of in-
come. For example, a number of income tax treaties require use of
the arm's length method of income allocation.71 These treaties, how-
ever, fail to provide specific guidelines directing its application.72
Therefore, each country will probably look to its own procedures re-
garding specific application of the arm's length method.73 As a re-
sult, conflicting allocations of income arising from inconsistent appli-
cations of the arm's length method still exist.
The second attempt to avoid double taxation while allowing
countries to maximize tax revenues is manifest in Mutual Agree-
ment Procedures (MAPs) within the tax treaties.74 The countries
may resort to MAPs to resolve disagreements75 over the application
of a specific treaty provision, such as the requirement of the arm's
69. Conflicting income allocations often result in economic double taxation of multina-
tional corporations and thereby impede the flow of international commerce.
70. Income tax treaties are designed to prevent not only double taxation, but double tax
evasion as well. See Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAx L. REV. 431,
445 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Norr].
71. See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28,
1967, United States - France, art. 8(1), 4 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, March 17, 1966, United States - United Kingdom, art. III, 1 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S.
No. 6089; Convention Respecting Double Taxation, March 4, 1942, United States - Canada,
art. IV, 56 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S. No. 983.
72. In fact, the United States is the only country to promulgate specific guidelines reg-
ulating application of the arm's length standard in individual cases. See Madere, supra note
26, at 113. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2 (P-H 1983) (sets forth specific allocation methods the Secre-
tary of the Treasury must use to reallocate income arising from the sale of goods). See also
supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
73. Although the treaty partners are bound by the general arm's length standard pro-
vided for in the treaty, they are free to choose the way in which they will determine what the
appropriate arm's length price is for a particular transaction. For example, in the United
States, Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)(3) provides that the proper arm's length price for the sale of
tangible goods shall be determined by the resale price method. This method starts with the
price at which the buyer of the product would resell the product and reduces it by an appropri-
ate markup percentage. The appropriate markup percentage is determined to be the rate ofprofit which the buyer would expect to realize on the sale of a similar product to a third party.
In contrast, Germans determine the arm's length price of a product by taking the manu-
facturer's cost and adding to it a profit which is equal to the normal rate of return earned on
investment capital. The French and Japanese use a similar method insofar as they begin with
the manufacturer's cost, but instead of adding on a profit equal to the rate of return on in-
vested capital, they add on a profit comparable to that earned by domestic firms in the same
industry. See Madere, supra note 26, at 113-19.
74. See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28,
1967, United States - France, art. 25, 4 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 17, 1965, United
States - West Germany, art. XVII, 2 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920; Convention Respecting
Double Taxation, March 4, 1942, United States - Canada, art. XVI, 56 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S.
No. 983.
75. See BISCHEL, supra note 68, at 445-503.
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length method. MAPs authorize competent authorities76 of con-
tracting nations to resolve any differences relating to application or
interpretation of treaty provisions." The authorities generally have
wide latitude to negotiate agreements and settle disputes, but must
still abide by the general provisions of the treaties. Accordingly,
when settling disputes concerning proper allocation of income, the
authorities must employ some version of the arm's length method. 8
This limitation on types of allocations available to contracting coun-
tries is a major factor in enabling competent authorities to arrive at
a mutual agreement concerning the allocation of income.
7 9
MAPs succeeded in relieving the effects of economic double tax-
ation in the majority of cases which have reached competent authori-
ties. 80 This success may be due in part to general agreement between
countries that any reallocation of income must follow the arm's
length method.8"
Of course, MAPs are a remedy to be applied only after double
taxation has occurred. Prevention of double taxation depends on har-
monization and clarification of international rules of income alloca-
tion.82 Unfortunately, although the international community has
adopted the arm's length method as the uniform rule of allocation,
double taxation still occurs as a result of inconsistent application of
this method. This inconsistency is attributable to the failure of the
international community to promulgate sufficiently specific regula-
tions regarding application of the arm's length method, as well as to
76. In the United States the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) of the Internal
Revenue Service is the competent authority.
77. The Competent Authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by
mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of
this Convention. In particular the Competent Authorities of the Contracting States may agree:
a) to the same attributions of income, deductions, credits, or allowances of
an enterprise of a Contracting State to its permanent establishment situated in
the other contracting states ....
U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty of'May 17, 1977, art. 25(3), 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 11019
(1977).
78. Oetjen, supra note 61, at 60.
79. Countries can allocate income up to the point at which their tax revenues are maxi-
mized under the arm's length standard, but they cannot go beyond this point. The limitation
on allocations facilitates the competent authorities arrival at a mutual agreement concerning
proper allocation of income. BISCHEL, supra note 68, at 461.
80. Statistics compiled in 1977 show that:
104 cases, or about 87 percent, have been closed with full relief from double
taxation; 5 cases or about 4 percent, have been closed with substantial relief
provided. Only about 11 cases, or about 9 percent, have been closed without any
relief. Generally, this has been the result of closed statutes of limitations on
refunds, or other procedural bars, rather than any breakdown of negotiations.
Id. at 485-86, quoting Joseph McGowan, Director of International Operations Internal Reve-
nue Service, THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE ON TAX AND BUSINESS PLANNING, New York
University, New York, N.Y. (September 27, 1977).
81. See supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Madere, supra note 26, at 132-135; Kragen, supra note 67, at 1516-17;
Norr, supra note 70, at 451-453.
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the defects inherent in the method itself.83
C. Critique
. The most pronounced shortcoming of the arm's length method
of income allocation is that it does not accurately reflect economic
reality. It is designed to reallocate income between related entities of
a multinational corporation to simulate the distribution of income
which would have arisen from the interaction of unrelated entities
dealing on the open market. 84 Before the arm's length method can be
applied, however, there must be a preliminary finding of common
ownership or control of the entities involved in the transaction. 5 The
transaction between these commonly controlled entities is then com-
pared to a similar transaction between uncontrolled entities dealing
on the open market. But such a comparison of unique entities is not
logically feasible. It is akin to comparing apples and oranges.
The arm's length method does not recognize the basic difference
in economic reality between controlled and uncontrolled corpora-
tions. Corporations under common control or ownership may be so
interrelated that the types of intracompany transactions in which
they engage are completely unlike those transactions between inde-
pendent entities dealing at arm's length." Similarly, the value that
flows between the related components of a multinational corporation
by reason of the functional integration of all the components simply
does not exist between unrelated entities.8 7 Thus, when intracom-
pany transactions are converted to arm's length transactions, the
benefits arising from interrelationship of component corporations are
not considered. 88 Accordingly, the resulting transfer of income is re-
allocated arbitrarily or not at all.
In addition to the theoretical weakness of the arm's length
method, problems arise in its practical application. Imposition of
83. Two countries using the arm's length method may still arrive at differing alloca-
tions of income because of difference in the way in which they calculate the appropriate arm's
length price. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Similarly, two countries may ar-
rive at different allocations simply because of the arbitrary nature involved in applying the
arm's length method to unique transactions. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
Any time two countries arrive at different allocations of income, the possibility of double taxa-
tion exists.
84. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., I.R.C. §482 (P-H 1983); Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(a)3 (P-H 1983); Conven-
tion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967, United States - France,
art. 8(2), 4 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
86. See, e.g., Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971) (court
found it impossible to reconstruct arrangements on arm's length basis because same exchange
of value would never have occurred on open market).
87. The flow of value between the related components of a multinational corporation
stems from such things as centralized management, economies of scale, and increased buying
power. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
88. The benefits of synergy do not exist on the open market. Note, Multinational Cor-
porations, supra note 31, at 1215.
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arm's length prices on transactions between controlled entities neces-
sitates determining the actual arm's length price for a particular
transaction. But, fluctuating variables such as time, place, and level
of the market often make comparison between a particular con-
trolled transaction and a similar uncontrolled transaction impossi-
ble.89 Moreover, although different methods for determining the
arm's length price of a controlled transaction have been devised,
these methods all ultimately rely on evidence of comparable transac-
tions occurring on the open market. 90 Therefore, because the arm's
length method requires comparable uncontrolled transactions which
often do not exist, determination of an arm's length price is fre-
quently arbitrary.
Another shortcoming of the arm's length method is the adminis-
trative burden associated with its application. As discussed above, 1
reallocation of income resulting from an intracompany transaction
requires gathering evidence of comparable uncontrolled transactions.
Because companies are not required to retain records of comparable
transactions, the effort and cost involved in compiling such evidence
can be formidable.92 In the words of the past chairman of the Multi-
state Tax Commission, "This is the accounting equivalent of trying
to build the Great Wall of China with an ice cream scoop." 93
This administrative burden, when coupled with the inaccuracy
of the arm's length method, has led some taxing jurisdictions to dis-
continue use of the arm's length method. The states in particular
have turned to the unitary method.
89. See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 997-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(intracompany sales not sufficiently comparable to sales made to bulk purchasers to establish
an arm's length value for the intracompany sales). For example, it is difficult to set an appro-
priate arm's length price for increased security, economies of scale, centralized management,
and other intangible benefits a subsidiary may receive by virtue of its affiliation with a large,
well established parent. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
90. The United States has promulgated the most specific regulations dealing with the
determination of arm's length prices for particular transactions. For example, the treasury has
devised four methods to determine arm's length price for sale of goods. See Treas. Reg.
§1.482-2(e) 1-4 (P-H 1983). The first three, however, require some sort of comparison with
similar transactions occurring on the open market. Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)2(ii) (P-H 1983);
Treas. Reg. §l.482-2(e)3(vii) (P-H 1983); Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)4(iii) (P-H 1983). The
fourth method allows the Secretary to allocate income by any method that is clearly more
appropriate than the first three methods. Courts have interpreted this to require that an alloca-
tion under this method be reasonable. See P.P.G. Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
Such a standard in turn ultimately relies upon a comparison with the open market to deter-
mine what is reasonable. See also supra note 73.
91. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
92. See Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 31, at 1219-20.





A. The Unitary Method
An alternative approach to income allocation is the unitary
method 4 employed by a number of state taxing authorities.95 This
method does not aim to recreate an allocation of income that would
have occurred through transactions on the open market. Instead, it
attempts to distribute the profits of an entire multinational corpora-
tion between the component's of the corporation in proportion to
each component's contribution to the overall profits. 6 Because the
unitary method does not compare particular intercorporate transac-
tions to similar arm's length transactions,97 it is able to account for
contributions to income that arise solely in the context of a closely
related unitary business, thereby correcting the basic defect of the
arm's length method. 98 Furthermore, administration of the unitary
method does not require compilation of evidence regarding arm's
length transactions.99 Therefore, it is significantly less burdensome
than the arm's length method. Use of the unitary method involves
little more than application of an abstract formula to a corporation's
total profits. 100
Before a multinational corporation's income can be apportioned,
however, there must be a preliminary finding that the corporation,
with all of its components, constitutes a unitary business. 101 A mul-
tinational corporation constitutes a unitary business when there is a
substantial mutual interdependence between the component parts of
the corporation. 0 Upon determination that the corporation is uni-
tary, each component of the corporation must file a combined report
setting forth the total income and expenses of the entire corporation
94. See supra note 44.
95. See supra note 46.
96. Income is allocated to those countries in which the factors of production are
located.
97. The arm's length method treats a multinational corporation as a conglomeration of
separate entities and focuses on each particular transaction engaged in by related components.
In contrast, the unitary method treats the multinational corporation as one large unitary busi-
ness and focuses on only the overall profits of the multinational corporation as a whole. Thus,
intracompany transactions between related components are ignored for tax purposes because
the multinational corporation as a whole does not realize any income until it engages in trans-
actions with unrelated third parties.
98. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
101. "[T]he linchpin of apportionability in the field of state taxation is the unitary busi-
ness principle." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4992 (U.S. 27,
1983) (No. 81-523) (contributions to income arising from centralized management and econo-
mies of scale are sufficient to make a multinational corporation unitary). Compare F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3139 (1982) (mere payment
of dividends to a parent company by a subsidiary is insufficient to give rise to a unitary busi-
ness). See generally McLure, supra note 27.
Spring 19841
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
as well as its own income and expenses.010 The net income of the
multinational corporation, as derived from the combined report, is
then apportioned between the individual components of the corpora-
tion according to a formula designed to achieve an overall division
and distribution of profits that fairly and properly reflects the contri-
butions made by each component of the corporation.04 In order to
do this, the formula incorporates certain factors of production"0 5
which are used to measure contributions made by individual compo-
nents. The percentage of overall corporate income to be allocated to
an individual component equals the percentage of the overall factors
of production attributable to that component. 06 Clearly, then, the
distribution of income produced by the unitary method depends upon
the factors of production comprising the formula, and the relative
weight given each factor.'
The three factor formula first developed in the Uniform Divi-
sion of Income for Tax Purposes Act is typical.'08 The three factors
deemed to produce income include payroll, property (real and per-
sonal), and sales.'0 9 The three factors are given equal weight " and
are measured by their value in dollars. The combined value of the
payroll, property, and sales existing within a particular jurisdiction is
a percentage of the combined value of the payroll, property, and
103. A combined report is distinguished from a separate report in that a combined re-
port contains information on the income of the entire multinational corporation. A separate
report, on the other hand, contains information on the income of only the component that is
filing the report. A combined report is distinguished from a consolidated report in that the
consolidated report treats the entire multinational corporation as one corporation with no sub-
sidiaries or affiliates. The combined report, on the other hand, preserves the individual identity
of each component to report on the income and expenses of the entire corporation, as well as
its own. Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and
Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171, 197 (1970).
104. See Surrey, supra note 40, at 415.
105. The different factors of production that may enter an apportionment formula in-
clude property, payroll, sales, cost of manufacturing, gross receipts, average inventory, and
purchases. The formula implicitly assumes that there is a direct relationship between the fac-
tors of production attributable to a corporation and the amount of income produced by that
corporation. See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate
Business, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 64-75 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hartman].
106. If 25 percent of a corporation's factors of production is attributable to a particular
component then 25 percent of the entire corporation's income is allocated to that component.
It is evident that the distribution of income that arises under the formula apportionment
method has nothing to do with the distribution of income that would arise from the operation
of the free market. Any correlation between the two is pure chance, unless it is believed that
market prices are determined by the factors of production. See Surrey, supra note 40, at 415-
18.
107. See Hartman, supra note 105.
108. See UDITPA, supra note 10.
109. Property is included because it is assumed that capital invested in a business pro-
duces income in return. Payroll is included because it reflects the value of the work done by
the business and its employees. Sales are included because they represent the successful com-
pletion of business activity. See Keesling & Warren, supra note 33, at 73-91.
110. Id. at 77 (suggesting that each factor is given equal weight because of the difficulty
involved in doing otherwise).
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sales attributable to the entire multinational corporation. Applying
this percentage to the corporation's total profits determines the per-
centage of profits allocable to the jurisdiction.111
B. Critique
The primary weakness of the unitary method is that it may pro-
duce artificial results. Its basic assumption that one unit of a factor
of production-payroll, property, or sales,-will produce one unit of
profit, regardless of the circumstances," 2 is not always true. For ex-
ample, if a particular subsidiary of a multinational corporation oper-
ates at a loss for a given year, but the multinational corporation as a
whole operates at a profit, the subsidiary will be allocated a percent-
age of that profit equal to its percentage of factors of production.
The subsidiary will accordingly be required to pay tax even though it
has no income. 1 This seemingly inequitable result may be explained
in part by the possibility that the subsidiary, through its affiliation
with the entire multinational corporation, contributed to the profit of
other components of the corporation." 4 But, it is equally possible
that the subsidiary did not contribute in any way to the profits of the
corporation, or that the cost of running the subsidiary at a loss actu-
ally detracted from the profits of the corporation. 15 In either case,
however, the tax consequences would be the same.
Moreover, state application of the unitary method to multina-
tional corporations aggravates the problem of double taxation. Be-
cause it is fundamentally inconsistent 1 6 with established national
and international practices of reallocating income according to arm's
length standards,"' the unitary method will produce different alloca-
tions of income. Double taxation Will therefore occur when a state,
using the unitary method, allocates to itself income which a foreign
country claims under the arm's length method.
In addition, the unitary method's allocation of more income to
111. For example, suppose that corporation A is a part of a unitary business and has 30
percent of the property, 40 percent of the sales, and 50 percent of the payroll. When the
factors are averaged together, corporation A will be found to have 40 percent of the factors of
production. Accordingly, 40 percent of the unitary business' entire profit will be allocated to
corporation A.
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924)(New York based branch of a multinational corporation operated at a loss for the given year
but was allocated a percentage of the entire corporation's income anyway).
114. These contributions could be either active or passive. The subsidiary could actively
engage in transfer pricing, or, through its passive affiliation with the whole corporation, could
contribute to the goodwill of the corporation. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
115. For a concrete example, see Donald C. Lubick's discussion of the Hong Kong Bank
of California. Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
116. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 45 and 71.
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jurisdictions having more valuable factors of production 118 ensures
economic double taxation of multinational corporations. Because the
United States tends to have higher payrolls and property values than
many other foreign countries, the unitary method will allocate more
income to United States based components of a multinational corpo-
ration than would a foreign country using the arm's length
method. 1 9 Similarly, the unitary method does not account for differ-
ing rates of return on investment. Investment in one country might
produce more profit than the same investment in another. The uni-
tary method, however, would allocate the same amount of profit to
each country because the factors of production which the investment
purchased would be the same. 2' This will result in double taxation
because foreign countries using the arm's length method will claim
the "extra" income produced by higher rates of return within their
borders, while the unitary method allocates this same income to the
states.12
State use of the unitary method in contravention of established
national and international norms may be a significant international
irritant.122 Although tax treaties to which the United States is a
party do not bind subgovernmental units such as states, 23 foreign
countries still view the unitary method as contrary to the policy and
118. The factors of production are measured by their dollar value. See supra notes 108-
II1 and accompanying text.
119. See Hearings, supra note 8 at 3-11 (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
120. Corporations doing business abroad may earn greater profits on their foreign in-
vestments than will corporations operating in the United States. Four indentifiable factors lead
to higher rates of return on investment in less developed foreign countries: 1) lower payroll
costs; 2) economies growing at a faster rate; 3) larger corporate share of the market; 4) lower
property costs. See Unopposed Testimony of John C. McDonald, Joint Appendix at 118,
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 31-523).
121. Assume, for example, a California parent P and an Italian subsidiary S are equal
in dollar value of their payroll, property, and sales. The investment in each enterprise is
$10,000,000.00. Further assume that the corporations comprise a unitary business, but conduct
all their transactions at arm's length so no reallocation of income is required. California parent
P realizes a profit of $2,000,000.00 in a given year. Italian subsidiary S, however, realizes a
$4,000,000.00 profit because the $10,000,000.00 invested in Italy is able to purchase twice the
property and labor as could be purchased in California. Italy will tax corporation S on the
$4,000,000.00 income generated in Italy. California, in turn, will apply the formula apportion-
ment method to the entire unitary business and allocate income equally between the two cor-
porations because the dollar value of property, payroll, and sales attributable to each corpora-
tion is equal. Thus, California will tax corporation P on $3,000,000.00, or half the income
generated by the entire unitary business. The result is that $7,000,000.00 is taxed when only
$6,000,000.00 was earned. Double taxation has occurred to the extent of $1,000,000.00.
122. Several national governments, including the entire European Economic Commu-
nity, have written letters to the United States Department of State expressing their disap-
proval of the unitary method and urging the United States Government to participate in the
litigation concerning the constitutionality of the unitary method as amicus curiae. These coun-
tries consider states' use of the unitary tax to tax multinational corporations to be inequitable
and unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Appendix D to Appellants Brief on the Merits at A.6-A.8,
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 81-523).
123. BISCHEL, supra note 68, at 6-7.
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spirit of the treaties. 24 Because the unitary method will often result
in allocating income away from foreign countries and to the United
States,'25 foreign countries may be less willing to take unilateral
steps to help relieve double taxation, 2' and negotiations through the
Mutual Agreement Procedure of tax treaties may be impeded. 1
Furthermore, foreign governments may retaliate against the United
States as a whole for what they regard as inequitable tax treatment
at the hands of the states. 28
V. Constitutionality of the Unitary Method
A. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board
In Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 9 the Supreme
Court held that state use of the unitary method to allocate income of
a domestically based multinational corporation is not unconstitu-
tional. Container Corp. involved application of California's three fac-
tor formula apportionment method's0 to allocate a multinational pa-
perboard manufacturer's income to its California-based sub-
sidiary.' 3 ' The corporation filed a tax return for the years 1963,
1964, and 1965 in which it reported its own net income, but not the
income of its foreign subsidiaries. The California Franchise Tax
Board issued notices to the corporation, directing it to include in its
combined report the income of its foreign subsidiaries.3 2 The inclu-
sion of this income had the effect of increasing the corporation's tax
liability in California. 33 The corporation paid the increased tax and
sued for a refund, claiming that California's method of taxation vio-
lated both the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 34
124. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 8, at 308 (statement of Joseph H. Gutlentag, Coun-
sel on Behalf of the Dutch Employers Federation).
125. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
127. Agreements to reduce double taxation will be reached much more easily when both
countries are using the same basic methods to allocate income. Disagreements arising from
differences in the fundamental approach to income allocation will be much more difficult to
reconcile. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
128. See Appendix to Brief for the Committee on Unitary Tax as Amicus Curiae at 7-
16, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 17, 1983) (No. 81-
523).
129. 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 81-523).
130. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. §25101 (West 1979).
131. Container Corporation of America is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Illinois. It does business in a number of states including California. For the
tax years in question, Container controlled twenty foreign subsidiaries located in four Latin
American countries and four European countries.
132. For a discussion of a combined report see supra note 96.
133. See Exhibit A-7, Stipulation to Record at 76-79, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987.
134. See generally Appellant's Brief on the Merits, Container Corp v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. 4987.
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1. Due Process Clause.-Under the due process clause, a state
may not tax value earned outside its borders.13 5 The Court has enun-
ciated two separate requirements that a state tax formula must meet
to insure that it does not tax income earned in other jurisdictions.
First, a minimal nexus, or connection, must exist between the inter-
national activities of the taxed corporation and the taxing state."3 6
Second, a rational relationship must exist between income allocated
to the state and the in-state value of the enterprise. 137
Container first attempted to show that California's application
of the unitary method to income from Container's entire multina-
tional enterprise unconstitutionally taxed value earned outside the
state. It reasoned that there was no connection between Container's
California subsidiary and its foreign subsidiaries1 38 and that interac-
tion between its domestic and foreign subsidiaries was insufficient to
justify California's determination that the entire multinational cor-
poration constituted a unitary business. 139 The Court, however, dis-
agreed, holding that a unitary business exists whenever there are
contributions to income of subsidiaries resulting from "functional in-
tegration, centralized management, and economies of scale."1 40
Under this standard, Container's domestic and foreign subsidiaries
were part of the same unitary business. The Court justified this find-
ing on the grounds that Container provided advice and consultation
services, sold equipment, and loaned money to its subsidiaries.""
Container next claimed that there was no rational relationship
between the income allocated to California and the value of
Container's California based operations. 42 Container argued that,
135. See, e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4988; ASARCO
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3109 (1982). See Rudolph, State Taxation
of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25
TAX L. REV. 171, 181 (1970).
136. The determination whether the international activities of a corporation have a mini-
mal nexus with corporate activities in the taxing state focuses on the state's decision to include
the income of foreign corporations in the domestic corporation's combined tax return. The
state requires the income of all corporations that it considers a part of the unitary business to
be included in the combined report because it is thought that any given component of a uni-
tary business will have some minimal connection with all other components of the unitary
business by reason of functional integration of all component parts. Controversies in this area,
therefore, center on the state's definition of the scope of the unitary business. See, e.g., Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
137. The determination whether there is a rational relationship between income allo-
cated to the state and instate value of the enterprise focuses on the factors employed by an
apportionment formula to allocate income to a particular jurisdiction and whether these fac-
tors clearly reflect income produced in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4993.
138. Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 11-15, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987.
139. Id.
140. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4992.
141. Id. at 4991.




according to its books,1" 3 its foreign subsidiaries were substantially
more profitable than its domestic subsidiaries, and that the inability
of the unitary method to account for differing rates of return on in-
vestment resulted in an allocation of income to its California branch
that was disproportionate to the actual value of its operations in
California. 14
The Court rejected this argument, too, noting the possibility
that certain aspects of the California operations contributed to the
foreign subsidiaries' increased profitability." 5 In so holding, the
Court stated that evidence of profitability produced by the arm's
length method, such as higher rates of return, cannot be used to im-
peach allocations of income produced by the unitary method.14 The
Court justified its position on the grounds that the unitary method
accounts for transfers of income which the arm's length method does
not reflect." 7 Therefore, the two methods will inevitably yield con-
flicting allocations of income, and until one method is proven more
accurate than the other, 48 the results produced by one cannot be
used to impeach those created by the other.
2. Commerce clause.-Container's commerce clause objection
was its strongest argument against California's use of the unitary
method. Container relied upon the principles set forth in Japan Line
Limited v. Los Angeles." 9 Japan Line involved California's attempt
to levy an apportioned property tax on shipping containers tempora-
rily located in the state. The containers were owned and registered in
Japan, and under accepted international practice, Japan, as the
home port, was allowed to tax the containers in full. In its decision,
the Court enunciated two considerations which come into play when
a state seeks to tax foreign commerce. First, the Court must be sen-
sitive to the enhanced risk of multiple taxation;5 0 and second, the
143. Profit figures produced by Container were based on separate accounting principles
which distributes income between component corporations in accordance with the arm's length
method of income allocation.
144. Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 16, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987.
145. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4993. The court noted that because the California branch and the
foreign branches were all part of the same unitary business there was a strong possibility that
there existed a flow of value from the California branch to the foreign branches. This flow of
value would account for the increased profit realized by the foreign subsidiaries.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
148. The court stated that it has seen "no evidence demonstrating that the margin of
error (systematic or not) inherent in the three factors formula is greater than the margin of
error (systematic or not) inherent in the sort of separate accounting urged on us by appellant."
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4993-94. Separate accounting and the
arm's length method are the same.
149. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
150. Id. at 447-8. The Court noted that the possibility of multiple taxation was greater
in the international sphere because there is no authoritative tribunal to insure that no more
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Court must consider the possibility that a state tax will impair fed-
eral uniformity in relation to foreign countries.'51 The tax involved in
Japan Line failed both tests. Because Japan was entitled to tax the
containers in full, any tax imposed by California, even if fairly ap-
portioned, would inevitably result in double taxation. 152 Similarly,
because the tax conflicted with established international policy, it
impaired federal uniformity and created a risk of retaliation by the
United States' foreign trade partners.'
Armed with the reasoning of Japan Line, Container asserted
that California's apportioned income tax was unconstitutional be-
cause it resulted in double taxation, impaired federal uniformity, and
would lead to foreign retaliation.'" The Court was unpersuaded. It
began its rejection of Container's argument by distinguishing Japan
Line on its facts. The Court first noted that Japan Line involved a
tax on property, not on income, and the reasons for allocation of the
entire value of property to a single situs for property tax are absent
in an income tax case. 55 The Court then observed that because Ja-
pan did have the right to fully tax the property, the assessment of
even a fairly apportioned tax on the property in Japan Line would
necessarily have resulted in double taxation. In the case of an in-
come tax, however, no one country has the right to tax all income of
a multinational corporation, and a fairly apportioned income tax
would therefore not necessarily cause double taxation. 56 Finally, the
Court reasoned that because the taxpayer in Japan Line was a for-
eign corporation, any double taxation would create a significant
chance of retaliation. In contrast, Container was a domestically
based corporation so there would be no chance of retaliation. 157
After distinguishing Japan Line factually, the Court went on to
hold that the California apportioned income tax met both require-
ments set forth in Japan Line. 58 First, unlike the tax in Japan Line,
the tax in Container Corp. did not create a constitutionally unac-
ceptable risk of double taxation. Recognizing the difficulty involved
in allocating income among taxing jurisdictions, the Court pointed
out that the internationally accepted arm's length method may itself
than 100 percent of the value of any instrumentality is subject to taxation.
151. Id. at 450-1. The Court recognized that a novel state tax may create an asymmetry
in the international tax structure and could lead to foreign retaliation if a foreign country was
disadvantaged by the tax.
152. Id. at 451-2.
153. id. at 452-3.
154. Appellants Brief on the Merits at 19-36, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51
U.S.L.W. 4987.






result in double taxation. 159 Therefore, because a risk of double taxa-
tion exists under the arm's length method, it would be unreasonable
to invalidate the unitary method because it also may result in double
taxation. 1 0
The Court finally disposed of Container's commerce clause ob-
jection by holding that the California income tax neither impaired
federal uniformity nor created a significant risk of foreign retalia-
tion. 161 The Court began by disclaiming any competence to discern
the foreign policy implications of a particular action. " It then listed
three factors which led it to believe the California tax would create
no significant foreign retaliation. First, the Court reiterated its find-
ing that formula apportionment as applied to income does not auto-
matically result in double taxation. Second, the Court observed that
the tax involved was imposed on a domestically based corporation,
greatly reducing the possibility of offending a foreign nation. Finally,
the Court noted that the corporation was amenable to taxation in
California in one way or another and the amount of its tax liability
is more a function of California's tax rate than of California's tax
method.16 3 These three factors taken together persuaded the Court
that risk of foreign retaliation was minimal. In sum, because Califor-
nia's tax did not lead to automatic double taxation, it did not create
a significant risk of foreign retaliation, and because it was not pre-
empted by anyfederal statute or treaty,"6 it was a constitutional ex-
ercise of state power.
B. Critique
In Container Corp., the Court adhered to its established policy
of granting the states wide latitude in exercising their power of taxa-
tion. 65 Implicit in the Court's decision is the principle that "a
formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when the tax-
payer has proved by 'clear and convincing evidence' that the income
attributed to the state is in fact 'out of all proportion to the business
transacted . . . in that state.' "166 State taxing procedures thus enjoy
an implicit assumption of validity absent conclusive evidence of un-
fairness or irrationality. The taxpayer's burden of proof is nearly im-
possible to sustain in view of the Court's statement that evidence of
159. See supra notes 61-68 and 71-73 and accompanying text.
160. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4996.
161. Id. at 4996-7.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
166. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978) (quoting Hans Rees' Sons
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
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income allocations derived from the arm's length method may not be
used to impeach allocations of income produced by the unitary
method.16 7 Extension of this stringent standard of proof to a case
involving foreign commerce appears anomalous when the Court itself
has recognized the need for increased scrutiny of state taxing
schemes in accordance with the two-fold test set forth in Japan
Line."6 8 Japan Line, therefore, should have controlled the Container
Corp. decision.
Moreover, in Japan Line, the state's apportioned property tax
inevitably led to double taxation since, according to international
custom, the country in which the property was owned and operated
has the right to tax the property in full. 6 9 Similarly, the apportioned
income tax levied by the state in Container Corp. inevitably led to
double taxation because, according to international custom, foreign
countries have the right to reallocate income of multinational corpo-
rations on an arm's length basis.1 70 As previously discussed, the uni-
tary method and the arm's length method will lead to different allo-
cations of income which, when applied at the same time to the same
income, will inevitably lead to double taxation .'7  Thus, the Califor-
nia tax should have been invalidated because it leads to substantial
risk of multiple taxation. 172
The Court in Container Corp., refused to invalidate the unitary
method on grounds of double taxation, reasoning that the arm's
length method could lead to the same result. 173 But this analysis fails
to recognize the basic difference between the two types of double
taxation involved. Double taxation under the arm's length method
arises from inconsistent applications of the same method.174 In con-
trast, double taxation under the unitary method arises from the fun-
damental difference between the unitary method and arm's length
accounting.
167. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text. The only time a taxpayer was
able to prove that a unitary method allocated too much income to a particular jurisdiction was
in Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
168. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4994.
169. The Home Port Doctrine states that instrumentalities of international commerce
may be taxed only by the country in which the instrumentality is owned and registered. This
country may tax the instrumentality in full. 441 U.S. at 441-44.
170. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
171. Whenever two countries allocate the same income to sources within their own bor-
ders, double taxation will occur. See Norr, supra note 70.
172. The creation of a substantial risk of double taxation is enough to invalidate a tax
under the foreign commerce clause. See Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 447-8
(1979).
173. "It would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require
California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor
of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation." Container Corp.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4996.
174. See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text.
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Double taxation produced by inconsistent applications of the
same method can be eliminated through promulgation of more spe-
cific regulations to insure harmonization of application, and through
international negotiation. 7 ' Double taxation arising from use of two
completely different methods, however, cannot be prevented through
harmonization of application. 1 6 Likewise, the possibility of reaching
an agreement on the proper allocation of income through MAPs di-
minishes when the nations involved have fundamentally divergent
views as to how the problem should be approached.17 7 Thus, while
the arm's length method may not actually be the more accurate ap-
proach,1 78 the unitary method must be evaluated within the frame-
work of established international practice favoring the arm's length
method.
Use of the unitary method in contravention of otherwise uni-
form international practices creates a substantial risk of double taxa-
tion, and therefore fails the first Japan Line test.' 79 Moreover, a
number of income tax treaties require the arm's length method of
income allocation.' 80 California's method conflicts with the uniform
principles set forth in these treaties. It therefore prevents the United
States from speaking with one voice with respect to this aspect of
foreign trade. Consequently, the California unitary income tax fails
the second Japan Line test as well.' 8 The asymmetry in interna-
tional income taxation created by California's use of the unitary
method also leads to a substantial risk of foreign retaliation by our
foreign trade partners who are disadvantaged by the asymmetry.' 82
Accordingly, California's apportioned income tax should have been
invalidated in Container Corp. for the same reasons its apportioned
property tax was invalidated in Japan Line.
VI. Conclusion
Undisputedly, double taxation severely burdens international
commerce and should therefore be avoided.' 83 Although no rules of
175. Complete harmonization of the standards regulating the application of the arm's
length method would prevent the assertion by taxing jurisdictions of overlapping claims to the
same income. However, until complete harmonization occurs, Mutual Agreement Procedures
are available to help mitigate the damaging effects of double taxation. See supra 46-83 and
accompanying text.
176. Cf. supra, notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
177. The existence of the arm's length method as a limit on the allocation of income
that countries make is a material factor is promoting agreement through the Mutual Agree-
ment Procedure. See supra notes 78 and 79 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 148.
179. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 71.
181. See supra note 153.
182. See supra note 122.
183. See generally Hearings, supra note 8.
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international law require countries to grant relief from double taxa-
tion, a number of countries have recognized the negative effect of
excessive tax burdens on international commerce, and have acted to
reduce double taxation.'84 The establishment of MAPs through in-
ternational tax treaties is a step in the right direction.18 5 Neverthe-
less, MAPs are only a cure applied after double taxation has oc-
curred. The real solution to the problem of international double
taxation lies in harmonization of substantive tax methods used by
individual governments.
The Supreme Court's decision in Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board is a step in the wrong direction. The Court claimed that
because the arm's length method of income allocation is no more
accurate than the unitary method, there was no reason to prohibit
state use of the unitary method."'8 This analysis, however, fails to
recognize the importance of uniformity of allocation procedures be-
tween taxing jurisdictions. Rather than refusing to require states to
use one method of income allocation because it is no more accurate
than another method, the Court instead could have chosen to pre-
serve existing uniformity of allocation procedures between taxing ju-
risdictions. By permitting states to continue applying the unitary
method to multinational corporations, the Court perpetuated irrecon-
cilable allocations of income and inevitable double taxation.
Fortunately, the Court's holding in Container is limited to situa-
tions involving domestically based multinational corporations. 187 A
case involving a foreign owned and controlled multinational corpora-
tion would present the Court with additional reasons to invalidate
state use of the unitary tax in the international context. The most
persuasive reason would be the increased threat of foreign retaliation
arising from states' attempts to tax income realized by foreign par-
ent corporations. 88 Hopefully, in such a case, the Supreme Court
would be more sensitive to the disruptive effect that application of
the unitary method to multinational corporations has on interna-
tional commerce. If not, international commerce will continue to suf-
fer from states' attempts to maximize their tax revenues through the
unitary method.
Bryan C. Skarlatos
184. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
187. The Court twice specifically distinguished the situation involving a multinational
corporation with a domestic parent from a situation involving a multinational corporation with
a foreign parent. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4995 and 4996-7.
188. Foreign countries will be more prone to take offense and implement retaliatory
measures when the corporation being taxed by the states is a foreign corporation as opposed to
an American corporation. See notes 156-57 and 161-63 and accompanying text.
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